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II. OF MORAL RIGHTS AND RESALE ROYALTIES:
THE KENNEDY BILL
MARSHALL A. LEAFFER***
A. The Dilemma of the Fine Artist: The Inadequacies of the Current
American Copyright Law
Art is a unique form of intellectual property requiring spe-
cial protection. However, many say that American law discrimi-
nates against artists and our artistic heritage, and have called for
amendments to the Copyright Act of 1976 ("Copyright Act").52
The current legislative attempt to undo this perceived insensitiv-
ity is the Visual Artists Rights Act ("Kennedy Bill"), introduced
by Senator Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.), in varying forms,
since 1986. 51
As its name suggests, the objective of the Kennedy Bill is to
provide increased protection to the rights of visual artists. The
purpose of this portion of the symposium is to examine the status
of the artist under the inadequacies of the current American
copyright law, and to examine the scope and content of the Ken-
nedy Bill. It will also explore the now defunct resale royalty pro-
vision of the pre-1988 Kennedy Bills. This provision, although
omitted from the current Kennedy Bill, continues to be a goal of
the creative artistic community, and thus merits discussion. In
the final analysis, federal legislation is the preferable solution to
the current concerns of artists, and with certain modifications the
Kennedy Bill is a solid legislative initiative that deserves wide-
spread public support.
*** Professor of Law, University of Toledo College of Law: B.A., 1964, University of
Texas; M.A., 1967, University of Illinois; J.D., 1971, University of Texas; L.L.M. 1977,
New York University.
52 17 U.S.C. § 401 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
53 The Kennedy Bill was first introduced as the "Visual Artists Rights Amendments
of 1986." S. 2796, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132 CONG. REC. S12,185 (daily ed. Sept. 9,
1986). The Kennedy Bill has gone through several significant changes. Most notably, in
its present 1988 version, supra note 34, it no longer contains its most controversial as-
pect: the provisions concerning a resale royalty for certain works of art. See Visual Art-
ists Rights Act, supra note 2.
Additionally, earlier versions of the Bill contained a provision deleting the notice
requirement for works of art. This aspect of the Bill is moot in view of the United States'
recent adherence to the Berne Convention and the abrogation of the notice requirement
for all works of authorship. See Berne Convention, supra note 38. What is essentially left
in the 1988 version of the Bill are the moral rights provisions. Senator Kennedy plans to
reintroduce this 1988 version in virtually the same. form to the 10 1st Congress. Com-
panion legislation has been introduced into the House by Representative Markey. See




The key provisions of the Kennedy Bill establish a "moral
right of integrity" for certain visual artists and, in its earlier ver-
sions, a resale royalty. As used in the Kennedy Bill, the term
''visual artist" is a misnomer because not all visual artists benefit
from this legislation.54 The more appropriate term would have
been "fine artist." The fine artist occupies a disfavored position
in the world of copyright.5 5 Unlike other authors who benefit
from selling multiples of their works, notably an author or musi-
cian, the fine artist is often limited to a single sale of a one-of-a-
kind work. In significant ways, the fine artist loses total control
over his work. Section 109(a) of the Copyright Act,5 6 known as
the "first sale doctrine," permits the owner of an artistic work to
dispose of it physically, so long as the owner of that work does
not reproduce it, adapt it or commit any other acts contrary to
the exclusive rights granted under section 106.- 7 Thus, once a
painting or sculpture is sold, nothingin the Copyright Act would
prohibit its buyer from defacing it, destroying it, or cutting it up
into little pieces and selling it in fragmented form. When any of
these acts occur, both the artist and our cultural heritage are
harmed.
The need for our legal system to sanction rights of integrity
is illustrated by the inequitable result reached in the seminal case
of Crimi v. Rutgers Presbyterian Church.58 Crimi had painted a large
54 See infra notes 64-66 and accompanying text discussing the many visual art forms
excluded from the Kennedy Bill.
55 See Goetzl & Sutton, Copyright and the Visual Artist's Display Right: A New Doctrinal
Analysis, 9 COLUM. J.L. & Arts 15, 16 (1984).
56 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1982 & Supp. V 1987) provides:
(a) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(3), the owner of a particu-
lar copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title, or any person author-
ized by such owner, is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner,
to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or phonorecord.
Id.
57 Subject to sections 107 through 118, the owner of copyright under ...
[section 106] has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the
following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or
lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform
the copyrighted work publicly; and
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the indi-
vidual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to the display
the copyrighted work publicly.
17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
58 194 Misc. 570, 89 N.Y.S.2d 813 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
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fresco on the wall of Rutgers Presbyterian Church depicting
Christ in a graphically physical manner. Crimi's portrayal of
Christ offended some of the parishioners, who eventually had the
fresco painted over in 1946. Outraged by the destruction of his
work, Crimi sued the church, but without success. He based his
suit on the doctrine of droit moral,59 or the moral right of the
artist to maintain the integrity of his work.60 Crimi sought an
action to compel the Church to remove the painting, or to permit
him to remove the fresco for his own use and to pay damages.
The court refused Crimi's request, unable to find redress under
American law for the injury that the artist suffered. 6' According
to the court, any control the artist may have over his work's phys-
ical destruction was defined under the existing contract law.6 2
However, few if any artists consider negotiating such matters in a
contract prior to the sale of a painting or sculpture.63
The first sale doctrine discriminates against fine artists in an-
other significant way-it deprives them of their ability to control
the secondary market for their work. 64 After an artist sells a
painting for a modest sum, art speculators are able to resell the
same painting for a significantly higher sum. The inequity is that
the fine artist can only benefit from the first sale of his work.6 5
One of the fundamental questions engendered by the dispute
59 Id. at 573, 89 N.Y.S.2d at 816.
60 See supra notes 37-43 and accompanying text.
61 Crimi, 194 Misc. at 576, 89 N.Y.S.2d at 819.
62 Id. To retain the right to prevent obliteration by express contract, Crimi would
have had to do so in writing, in conformance with § 242 of the New York Real Property
Law.
63 A Calder mobile donated to the Pittsburgh airport provides another example of
the powerlessness of the artist facing the destruction or mutilation of his work of art.
Alexander Calder, the artist who created the mobile, lost all right to control the display
of his work once title was conveyed. See Rose, Calder's Pittsburgh: .4 Violated and Immobile
Mlobile, ARTNEWS, Jan. 1978, at 39.
64 [T]he copyright owner's exclusive right of public distribution would have
no effect upon anyone who owns "a particular copy or phonorecord law-
fully made under this title" and who wishes to transfer it to someone else
or to destroy it...
[F]or example, the outright sale of an authorized copy of a book frees
it from any copyright control over its resale price or other conditions of its
future disposition.
H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 17 U.S.C. § 109, at 35 (1982)(his-
torical revisions and notes).
65 Contractual arrangements for a royalty upon a subsequent resale of a work have
largely been unsuccessful due to either the artist's lack of awareness of the possibility of
a contractual arrangement or the artist's inferior bargaining position. The best known
attempt at a contractual solution is known as the Projansky contract, under which the
artist retains a 15% royalty on the enhanced value of his work. Under this contract, "the
buyer agrees that he will not alienate the work without procuring the transferee's agree-
ment to be bound by the terms of the original contract." Solomon & Gill, Federal and
State Resale Royalty: "l'hat Hath Art llrought," 26 UCLA L. REV. 322, 327 (1978).
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over resale royalties is whether the artist should have the right to
share in the profits derived from the subsequent sale of his
works. An often cited example of this inequity was the sale of a
Robert Rauschenberg painting for $85,000 which the seller, Rob-
ert C. Scull, had bought for $1,000 several years earlier.6 6 Raus-
chenberg, of course, would have liked to have shared in the
enormous profit and believed he had a right to share the profit.6 7
Fine artists have long felt short-changed by copyright law.
By comparison, the composer of a popular song has a statutory
entitlement to a fee for every performance of the song played on
the radio, television, and other public settings.6" Nothing given
to the fine artist in the Copyright Act approximates the lucrative
performance right of the musical copyright owner. In compari-
son, the analog of the public performance right - the display
right - is ineffective in compensating the fine artist.
Under section 106(5) of the Copyright Act,6 9 an author of a
pictorial, graphic or sculptural work is given the exclusive right
to display his work publicly. At first blush, the display right
would appear to confer similar benefits on the fine artist that the
performance right does for the musical copyright owner. In real-
ity, however, the explicit limitations on the display right render it
a much less powerful "exclusive" right than that of the public
performance right. First, section 106(5) limits the display right
to public displays.7y Second, and more important, the limitation
on the display right found in section 109(c) gives the owner of a
copy of the work the right to display it publicly.7 ' Thus, absent an
66 Artists Decide They Should Share Profits on Resale of Paintings, Wall St. J., Feb. 11, 1974,
at 1, col. 4. Due to the inequity resulting from the sale of the Rauschenberg painting,
Mr. Rauschenberg and others, such as Rubin Gorewitz, a New York accountant and fi-
nancial advisor, have lobbied in Washington "for a federal law that would make royalties
mandatory for all sales over a certain amount, probably $1,000." Id. Under the pro-
posed plan, "the artist would validate the authenticity of a work, as well as collect a
royalty, each time it changed hands." Id.
67 There are other examples of even greater discrepancies between the original and
resale price. For example, the artist James Rosenquist is said to have originally sold a
work for $500 which was subsequently resold for $274,000. See The Great Debate Over
Artist's Rights, Washington Post, May 22, 1988, at F4, col. 2.
68 Composers receive performance fees for the use of the copyrighted composition
of the sound recording. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982 & Supp. V 1987). Composers are
represented by collection agencies such as the American Association of Composers and
Performers ("ASCAP") and Broadcast Music, Inc. ("BMI"), which monitor perform-
ances, and, based on statistical extrapolations, collect and distribute payments from the
users.
69 17 U.S.C. § 106(5) (1982 & Supp. V 1987). See supra note 57 for text of the
section.
70 Id.
7' 17 U.S.C. § 109(b) (1982 & Supp. V 1987):
... the owner of a particular copy lawfully made under this title, or any per-
son authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the authority of the copy-
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agreement to the contrary, the owner of a copy of a painting,
drawing, or sculpture can display the work publicly, and charge
an admission to see it without ever having to reimburse the
author.
The Kennedy Bill does not purport to change the Copyright
Act generally, but to aid the fine artist specifically. It would in-
corporate two aspects of copyright law relatively foreign to
American law: what is known as the moral right and, from the
1987 version of the Bill, the resale royalty right.
The moral right and the resale royalty are interrelated con-
cepts.72 First, both have been recognized for some time in civil
law jurisdictions7" and both are at odds with the basic thrust of
American copyright law. Second, the goal of each is to protect
the fine artist and encourage artistic creation. This is accom-
plished by allowing the artist to have a degree of artistic and eco-
nomic control over a work beyond its initial sale.
The moral right and the resale royalty differ, however, in the
interests they protect. The moral right is a personal right pro-
tecting an artist's expression as an extension of the artist's per-
sonality.74 By comparison, the resale royalty right is basically an
economic right - allowing an artist to recover a percentage of
the resale price of his work.75 Although both concepts are for-
eign to federal copyright law as yet, they have been accepted in
varying degrees in state law. The moral right has been adopted
by nine states 76 and the resale royalty right by one state,
California.77
right owner, to display that copy publicly, either directly or by the projection
of no more than one image at a time, to viewers present at the place where
the copy is located.
Id.
72 See, e.g., Plaisant, Droit de Suite and Droit Moral under the Berne Convention, 11
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 157, 157 (1986) [hereinafter Plaisant]. "[They] both appear to be
the lost children of the Droit D'Auteur."
73 The droit de suite is part of the law of, for example, the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, and many eastern European and developing
countries. See id. at 159. The droit moral is also part of German and French law, and is
law in many eastern European and South American countries. Id. at 162-63.
74 See Roeder, 7he Doctrine of 11oral Right: A Study in the Law of Artists, Authors and
Creators, 53 HARV. L. REV. 554, 578 (1940). Moral rights "may be defined as the right of
the creator to create, to present his creation to the public in any desired form or to
withhold it, and to demand from everyone respect for his personality as creator and for
his works." Id. (citing MICHAELIDES-NOUAROS, LE DROIT MORAL DE L'AUTEUR 68 (1935)).
75 See, e.g., Plaisant, supra note 72, at 159. The resale royalty right provides "a form
of maintenance . . . [since] [i]t is unjust that a work, say a painting or sculpture by a
young author, should be sold by him for a minimal sum .... [and] resold for a larger
amount of money without the author or his heirs . .. benefitting from that resale." Id.
76 See supra note 16.
77 CAL. CIV. CODE § 986 (West 1982 & Supp. 1989).
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The basic thrust of the Kennedy Bill is not new. Since the
late 1970s, legislation has been introduced proposing moral right
protection and resale royalties for artists. 78 What has changed is
a heightened interest in copyright and intellectual property in
general and a less ethnocentric view of our place in the world
community. Congress has recently shown a more receptive atti-
tude toward reassessing our traditional notions of copyright law,
as evidenced by America's recent adherence to the Berne Con-
vention. 79 Thus, the 1988 Kennedy Bill has a more favorable
chance of being enacted than before; this is particularly true
since its most recent version has deleted the highly controversial
resale royalty rights provisions.8 °
B. The Moral Right: An Overview
The moral rights provisions in the Kennedy Bill are clearly
its most important aspect. The concept of "moral rights," de-
rived from the term droit moral in French law, 81 regards an au-
thor's work as an extension of his personality, something that
remains a part of his life, even after he has physically parted with
the work.82
Although its origins can be traced back to the French
78 See, e.g., bills introduced by Rep. Robert Drinan, H.R. 8261, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1977)and by Rep. Barney Frank, H.R. 2908, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) and H.R.
1521, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
79 Berne Implementation Act, supra note 37.
80 The original Kennedy Bill provided for an artist's royalty of seven percent of the
difference between the seller's purchase price and the amount the seller received on the
resale. Visual Artists Rights Act, supra note 2, § 3. The 1988 version makes no reference
to royalties whatsoever. Kennedy Bill, supra note 34.
81 French law officially recognized droit moral in their 1957 copyright law. See Loi de
11 Mars 1957, supra note 10. In addition to France, sixty other countries recognize some
version of the moral right. See Comment, The Monty Python Litigation-Of Moral Rights and
the Lanham Act, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 611, 615 (1977) (citing Comment, Copyright, Moral
Right-A Proposal, 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 793, 797 n.47 (1975)); see also Kwall, Copyright and
the Moral Right: Is An American Marriage Possible?, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1, 97 (1985).
82 By comparison, under American law, we treat the output of an artist much like any
other commodity, conferring what are known as economic or pecuniary rights. These
are principally embodied in the exclusive rights provisions of Section 106 of the Copy-
right Act, encompassing the rights of reproduction, adaptation, distribution, public per-
formance, and public display. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982). See supra note 57.
The exclusive rights are not absolute, however, since they are subject to "the first
sale doctrine." See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text. The first sale doctrine al-
lows the author to benefit only from the first sale of a copy of a work. But once the
author has sold that copy, its new owner has the right to dispose of it as he wishes absent
a contractual agreement to the contrary. See, 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1982). See supra note
56. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in, 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5659, 5693 explains that the effect of § 109 (a), for example, would be that
the outright sale of an authorized copy of a book frees it from any copyright control over
its resale price or other conditions of its future disposition. 'A library that has acquired
ownership of a copy is entitled to lend it under any conditions it chooses to impose
[subject to a conditional contract between buyer and seller].
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Revolution, the moral right does not exist in one definitive
83version.
Article 6bis of the Berne Convention, Paris text, provides in
part:
(1) Independently of the author's economic rights, and even
after the transfer of the said rights, the author shall have the
right to claim authorship of the work and to object to any dis-
tortion, mutilation, or other modification . . . which would be
prejudicial to his honor or reputation. 84
In sum, Berne permits an artist-independent of economic rights-
the right to claim authorship of the work (the paternity right)85 and
the right to preserve this work from any distortion or mutilation of
the work (the integrity right). These rights exist independently of a
transfer of the copyright. There are other components of the moral
right which are sometimes included under this umbrella term. The
right of first publication-otherwise known as the right of divulga-
tion-gives an artist the absolute right to determine if and when a
work is complete and ready to be shown to the public, 6 and has
long been recognized under American law.8 7 Another component
Id.
As Crimi indicates, current American copyright law prohibits the new owner of the
fresco from intentionally obliterating it. See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
The Kennedy Bill, however, would recognize, for the first time, the moral right of the
artist on the federal level, and in doing so, would preempt state statutes. L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 376-77 (1978).
[S]tats are [often] deemed powerless to act because of a vacuum deliber-
ately, even if not expressly, created by federal legislation. In such cases, any
state or local action, however consistant in detail with relevant federal stat-
utes, is held invalid-not because of a "dormant" federal power thought to
be constitutionally exclusive but rather because the federal legislative scheme
announces, or is best understood as implying, a congressional purpose to
occupy the field!"
Id.
Tribe notes, however, that the "question whether federal law 'preempts' state action, [is]
largely one of statutory construction, [and] cannot be reduced to general formulas." Id.
at 377.
8-3 See, e.g., Plaisant, supra note note 72.
84 Berne Convention For The Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Paris Act,
July 24, 1971, art. 6bis (1) 828 U.N.T.S. 221, reprinted in 4 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPy-
RIGHT at §§ 27-1 to -14 [hereinafter Berne Convention, Paris Act]. Moral rights have
been a part of the Berne Convention since the Rome revision of 1928. In addition to the
United States, some seventy-six countries are members of the Berne Convention. See
Hearings before the Subcomm. oni Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks of the Comm. on theJudiciarv
On US. Adherence to the Berne Convention, 99th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 11 (1985) (statement
of Arpad Bogsch).
85 This often includes the converse right to renounce credit where the artist feels that
the integrity of the work has in some way been damaged.
" The right of first publication is generally recognized in the distribution right
granted under section 106(3). 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982 & Supp. 1987). See supra note 57.
87 Justice Brandeis argued that "[t]he principle which protects personal writings and
all other personal productions, not against theft and physical appropriation, but against
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of the moral right is the right of withdrawal which would allow the
author to withdraw a work after the payment of just compensation.
This right has seen little practical application even in a country like
France, which recognizes it.8 s
Congress avoided the question of including a moral rights pro-
vision in the Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988.89 The
Berne enabling legislation was instead based on a "minimalist" ap-
proach to adherence - that is, to change the Copyright Act only
where necessary. 90 Under this approach, moral rights of the author,
as required by 6bis of Berne, were deemed to be adequately pro-
tected when the entirety of United States law was taken into ac-
count. 9' Advocates of the minimalist approach asserted that unfair
competition,9 2 defamation law, 93 and the adaptation right 94 under
copyright law constructed a web of protection equivalent to the pa-
ternity and integrity rights. For example, the display of an altered
work of art could contravene, depending on the circumstances, one
or more bodies of law. It might, for instance, constitute a false
designation of origin under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act95 or
defamation of the artist's professional reputation.
The assertion that the entirety of American law taken as a whole
provides defacto protection of the author's moral right is inaccurate
publication in any form, is in reality not the principle of private property, but that of an
inviolate personality." Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 205
(1890).
88 See Loi De 1l Mars 1957, supra note 10. See also DaSilva, Droit Moral And The
Amoral Copyright: A Comparison of Artists' Rights in France And The United States, 28 BULL.
COPYRIGHT L. Soc'y 1 (1981). Droit de retrait is the right of the author to withdraw a work
which valready has been made public. Although this right was discussed by French jurists
prior to 1957, it was not actually applied until this time. Even after 1957, however, few
French cases have dealt with this right, and those actually supporting this right continue
to differ on the nature and scope of its application. Id. at 23-24.
89 See Berne Implementation Act, supra note 37. See also Final Report of the Ad Hoc
Wforking Group ol U.S. Adherence to the Berne Convention, reprinted in 10 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS
513 (1986)[hereinafter Final Report].
9o Berne Implementation Act, supra note 37. See also Final Report, supra note 89.
91 Berne Convention, Paris Act supra note 89, art. 6bis; see also Geller, Comments on
Possible US. Compliance with Article 6 bis of the Berne Convention, 10 COLUM.J.L. & ARTS 665
(1986). 3
92 See Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1981). An action was brought
against a film distributor for removing the author's name from the film credits and sub-
stituting that of another. This amounted to "express passing off" and constituted a
valid claim under § 43(a) of the Lanham Trademark Act, which forbids the use of false
designations of origin and false descriptions concerning the advertising or sale of goods
and services. Id.
' Clevenger v. Baker Voorhis & Co., 8 N.Y.2d 187, 203 N.Y.S.2d 812, 168 N.E.2d
643 (1960). The court held that because a jury could reasonably conclude that defend-
ant's revision of plaintiff's book, in which defendant made numerous errors, misled the
public into believing the work had been done by plaintiff, a defamation action was
maintainable.
)4 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (1982 & Supp. V 1987); For text, see supra note 57.
95 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
242 CARDOZO ARTS & ENTERTAINMENT [Vol. 7:227
at best. Protection under the Lanham Act or defamation law falls
short of a direct recognition of the artist's moral right.96 First, it is
not clear whether an unfair competition action could be brought if a
defendant had properly disclosed prior to public showing that the
alteration had taken place.97 Second, because these causes of action
are based on reputational harm or unfair competition, they fail to
protect the artist from the total destruction of a work of art.98 The
Kennedy Bill, however, vindicates the moral right of the artist by
prohibiting the display of an intentionally altered work of art. It
stops short, however, of an absolute recognition of an artist's integ-
rity right.
C. Moral Right Provisions of the Kennedy Bill
In its latest version, the Kennedy Bill creates a moral right
for certain visual artists. The Kennedy Bill would add a new sec-
tion 106(a) to the Copyright Act, giving those artists exclusive
unwaivable and unassignable rights of paternity and integrity during
their lifetimes.99 This provision, however, both falls short of the
96 See generally Damich, Moral Rights in the United States and Article 6bis of the Berne Con-
vention: A Comment on the Preliminary Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on U.S. Adherence to
the Berne Convention, 10 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 655 (1986).
[T]he Second Circuit recognized ... that an artist has a right based on sec-
tion 43(a) of the Lanham Act "to have his works attributed to him in the form
in which he created it." However, this leaves open the question whether a
work could be modified as long as it was not attributed, or ... as long as a
disclaimer was added .... [A]ny fraud-based cause of action such as section
43 (a) arguably requires some kind of attribution. Given the absence of a real
right of attribution in the U.S., the potentiality of the Lanham Act to protect
the right of integrity is significantly weakened.
... [T]he law of defamation is inherently inadequate to protect works to
the extent required by the plain meaning of Article 6bis. . . . [S]ince libel
requires injury to reputation, it implies that the work must be attributed, and
... there is the question whether it is an appropriate cause of action in the
case of complete destruction of the work.
Id. at 660-61 (citations omitted).
97 This disclosure may imply the existence of contractual negotiations and terms be-
tween the author and the defendant which would protect the defendant against any false
attribution claims. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1982 & Supp. V 1987) which reads in part:
Any person who shall affix, apply, or annex, or use in connection with
any goods or services ... any false description or representation ... shall be
liable to a civil action by any person ... who believes that he is or is likely to
be damaged by the use of any such false description or representation.
See also Verbit, Moral Rights and Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act: Oasis or Illusion?, 9 HAS-
TINGS COMM/ENT. L.J. 383, 405-14 (1987).
98 For a discussion of the limitations of American law in protecting the moral right
through unfair competition law and related doctrines, see Horowitz, Artists' Rights in the
United States: Toward Federal Legislation, 25 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 153, 173-84 (1988).
9) Sec. 3 of the Kennedy Bill reads in relevant part:
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Berne Convention-by confining protection to visual artists'°°-
and exceeding it-by specifying that these rights are unassigna-
ble and unwaivable.
As indicated, the Kennedy Bill contains an expanded right of
paternity and a somewhat less protective right of integrity. A pa-
ternity right under the Bill would permit an artist to claim or dis-
claim authorship of publicly displayed works and to bring
infringement actions when such works are mutilated or altered by
acts of intentional or gross negligence.' 0 ' The author would pos-
sess the exclusive right to bring an action for infringement dur-
ing his lifetime for violation of the paternity right. For example,
the copyright owner who is not the author of the work cannot
claim the paternity right.'0 2 Therefore, the Bill precludes an ac-
tion to remedy alterations of the work unless the work was pub-
licly displayed in that condition. Under the Bill, the integrity
right is more limited. It would make the destruction of a work of
recognized stature by an act of intentional or gross negligence an
(a) Independent of the copyright owner's exclusive right ... , the au-
thor of a work of visual art ... shall have the right during his life to claim...
or to disclaim authorship of ... his works of visual art ....
(b)(1)(A) ... Where the author is not the copyright owner, he alone shall
still have the exclusive right during his lifetime to assert infringement of the
copyright ....
(c) The author's rights provided in subsections (a) and (b) may not be
waived or assigned.
Kennedy Bill, supra note 34, § 3 (emphasis added).
100 A comparison of S.1619 with the provision of the Berne Convention
reveals that the bill's moral rights provisions are both broader and nar-
rower. For example, under Article 6bis of the Convention, all categories of
works are protected. The Kennedy bill would protect only pictorial,
graphic, and sculptural works.... Taken literally, the bill would permit the
creators of publicly displayed works of fine art to disclaim authorship
where any alteration of the work was made. Berne allows the author to
object to changes only when they prejudice the artist's honor or
reputation.
Hearings on S. 1619, supra note 6, at 22 (statement of Ralph Oman, Register of Copy-
rights) [hereinafter Statement of Ralph Oman].
101 Id.
(B)(2)... [T]he destruction, by an intentional act or gross negligence, of
a work of recognized stature is a violation of the exclusive rights of the au-
thor of the work. Where the author is not the copyright owner he shall still
have the exclusive right during his lifetime to assert infringement of the
copyright ....
Kennedy Bill, supra note 34, § 3(b)(2).
102 (b)(1)(A) [T]he substantial mutilation or alteration of a work of visual art,
which is publicly displayed caused by an intentional act or gross negligence
is a violation of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner where the au-
o thor of the work is the copyright owner. Where the author of the work is
not the copyright owner, he alone shall still have the exclusive right during
his lifetime to assert infringement of the copyright ....
Id. at § 3.
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infringement of copyright.' This limited integrity right follows
the model of the New York Authorship Act 0 4 rather than the
California Art Preservation Act. 10 5
As manifested in several key provisions, the Kennedy Bill es-
sentially protects works of fine art, paintings, graphic arts, and
sculpture. The Bill applies only to works existing in a single or in
a limited number of copies, including limited edition prints or
multiple cast sculptures of 200 or less.10 6 It also excludes a
whole range of works such as photographs, posters, maps,
globes, technical drawings, and motion pictures.'0 7 The Bill does
not directly address the colorization of black and white films'08
and excludes works made for hire.' 0 9
When a work cannot be removed from a building without
mutilation or defacement, the artist's moral rights are waived, ab-
sent a contract between the owner of the building and the author
that indicates otherwise. This contract must be recorded in the
applicable state real property registry. " 0 The origin of this pro-
vision can be traced to a powerful real estate lobby which has
always feared moral rights legislation and has focused its atten-
tion on this class of works."' The fact that most state moral right
statutes have public building limitations can be attributed to the
efforts of this lobby.' 12
The Bill contains several provisions directed specifically to
museums and others who display and conserve art. One provi-
103 Id.
104 See N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW §§ 14.53 - .59 (McKinney's 1987). The New York
act is even more limited by not recognizing an actionable wrong outside the display
context.
105 See California Art Preservation Act, CAL. CIV. CODE § 987 (West 1982 & Supp.
1989) which states, in relevant part: "(a) Legislative findings and declaration. The ... physi-
cal alteration or destruction of fine art ... is detrimental to the artist's reputation, and
artists therefore have an interest in protecting their works ... against such alteration or
destruction ...."
The reason for the difference in the approach of the California and New York stat-
utes has been explained by interest group influence on the legislation. In New York, the
power of the major museums and art dealers was apparently much stronger than in
California. The New York groups feared liability for improper conservation of a work of
art. See Levy, Artists' .oral Rights, I I L.A. LAW., Mar. 1988, at 11.
1o6 Kennedy Bill, supra note 34.
107 Id.
108 The Film Integrity Act of 1987, H.R. 2400, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987), allows
authors the exlusive right to authorize colorization.
1n9 Kennedy Bill, supra note 34, § 11 reads: "Nothing in this Act, or the amendments
made by this Act, shall be construed to apply ... [to] a work made for hire as defined in
section 101 of title 17, United States Code".
1 10 Id. at § 4. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 987(h)(1) (West 1982 & Supp. 1989).
I I ' See infra note 162 and accompanying text.
112 This provision is similar to that of the California Art Preservation Act. See CAL.
CIV. CODE, § 987(h)(1) (West 1982 & Supp. 1989).
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sion allows a work to be displayed in an altered state, when the
alteration has occurred from acts beyond the possessor's con-
trol.' 1 3 When a museum conservator actively alters a publicly
displayed work, however, the Bill requires this alteration to be
accomplished non-negligently." 4 This provision appears to
place enhanced responsibility on conservators of works of art in
the exercise of their profession.
The Bill protects only those works that have attained "recog-
nized stature"." 5 This provision of the bill, borrowed from the
California Art Preservation Act,' 16 is a radical departure from
American Copyright law. Ever since Bleistein v. Donaldson Litho-
graphing Co., 117 courts may not consider artistic quality in decid-
ing whether to protect a work. The purpose of this departure is
to preclude nuisance suits brought, for example, by irate parents
whose six-year-old's work is thrown away by her teacher." 8 The
occasional nuisance suit, however, hardly justifies a provision
which may discriminate against avant-garde or experimental art
forms which may not achieve "recognized stature" in traditional
art circles.
1"3 "The alteration or mutilation of a work of visual art which is a result of the passage
of time or the inherent nature of the materials" is actionable only if the "alteration or
mutilation" occurs through gross negligence in maintaining or protecting the work.
Kennedy Bill, supra note 34, § 3(B).
114 Id. (alteration which occurs from competent and appropriate observation is not a
violation).
115 Id. The concept of "recognized stature" is a question of fact which may be based
on opinions of artists, art dealers, museum personnel, and other specialists. Id. A "work
of recognized stature" is defined as:
a work of visual art determined to be of recognized stature. In determining
whether a work is of recognized stature, a court or other trier of fact may take
into account the opinions of artists, art dealers, collectors of fine art, curators
of art museums, conservators of recogized stature, and other persons in-
volved with the creation, appreciation, history, or marketing of works of rec-
ognized stature. Evidence of commercial exploitation of a work as a whole or
of particular copies, does not preclude a finding that the work is a work of
recognized stature.
Id. § 2.
1 1ii As defined in the California Civil Code, "fine art" is "an original painting, sculp-
ture, or drawing, or an original work of art in glass, of recognized quality, and of substantial
public interest." CAL. CIv CODE § 989(b)(1) (West 1982 & Supp. 1989) (emphasis
added).
1 17 188 U.S. 239 (1903). In Bleislein, a plaintiff lithographing company designed pic-
ture posters for a circus to use as advertisements. Plaintiff lithographing company
brought suit against defendant lithographing company for infringement of copyright,
claiming defendants reproduced three lithographs prepared by employees of plaintiff
for circus advertisements.
The question presented to the .Supreme Court was whether the lithographs were
within the protection of the copyright law. Justice Holmes, writing for the majority, held
that "[i]t would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to con-
stitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the nar-
rowest and most obvious limits." Id. at 251.
118 See i'fra note 169 and accompanying text.
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D. The Kennedy Bill and Resale Royalty Rights/Droit de Suite
The national resale royalty provision of previous Kennedy
Bills is a far more controversial issue than the moral right." 9
The resale royalty right provision was replaced in the 1988 ver-
sion of the Kennedy Bill with a mandate to study the resale roy-
alty right for one year in order to determine its feasibility. 20
Many advocates argue that equitable considerations require that
the United States join countries like France and Germany, as well
as the State of California, 121 which recognize the resale royalty. 122
Resale royalties also advance the policy behind moral rights of
maintaining a continuing relationship between the artist and the
work of art. ' 23
The Bill's 1987 version of the royalty provision, like the Cali-
fornia Act, applied to works resold for $1,000 or more.'2 42 Unlike
the California Act, it applied only when the seller resold the work
at a price no less than 150% of the purchase price. 2 5 The pur-
pose of this provision was to avoid imposing a resale royalty on a
work unless a substantial profit was realized. The 150% resale
119 Unlike its treatment of the moral right, the Berne Convention allows but does not
mandate recognition of the resale royalty right-droit de suite. The question is left to
national legislation. See Berne Convention, Paris Act, supra note 84, art. l4bis.
120 Visual Artists Rights Act, supra note 2, § 3.
121 See generally infra notes 143-2 10 and accompanying text. In 1976, California en-
acted a resale royalty right law-the first time such a right was recognized in the com-
mon-law world. Id. The 1987 version of the the Kennedy Bill adopted the general
structure of the 1976 California Resale Royalty Act. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 986 (West
1989). However, it modified some of the California Act's provisions objectionable to
buyers and sellers of art. The 1987 version of the Bill also imposed an unwaivable,
although transferable, seven percent royalty on the resale of a work of art as defined by
the Bill. Visual Artists Rights Act, supra note 2, § 3:
Whenever a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work is sold, the seller shall pay a
royalty to the author. . . . Such royalty shall be equal to 7 percent of the
difference between the seller's purchase price and the amount the seller re-
ceives in exchange for the work. The right of the author to receive this roy-
alty may not be waived.
The royalty would attach to the resale of the work for the life of the author plus fifty
years. Id. "Where the author is deceased at the time of the sale, and the sale occurs
within 50 years after the death of the author, such royalty shall be paid to the estate of
the author." Id. at (d)(1).
122 Although only twenty-one of the fifty-one nations polled in a 1983 UNESCO sur-
vey had resale royalty right laws, in Europe these included France, Germany, and Italy.
SeeJ. MERRYMAN & A. ELSEN, LAW, ETHICS, AND THE VISUAL ARTS 213 (2 ed. 1987)[here-
inafter MERRYMAN & ELSEN].
123_ See Koegel, Memorandum of Support for S. 2796: Introduced in the 99th Congress by Sena-
tor Edward .1. Kennedy (D. .Mlassachusetts) 11 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 347, 349 (1987). "[Ilt is
hardly unreasonable for artists to seek respect for a continuing connection with the
orginal unique work. It is not inappropriate for this connection to be economic." Id. at
349.
124 See id. (denying a resale royalty right when the resale price of a work is less than
$1,000i.
125 See id. (denying a royalty right where the resale price is less than 150% of the price
paid by the reseller).
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limitation took into account both inflation and the costs of resale
so as not to unduly penalize the buyer. 126 To benefit from the
resale royalty, the 1987 Bill required that the artist register the
work in the Copyright Office prior to resale.
127
Whether the resale royalty act would benefit the fine artist
and create a healthier climate for artistic production and dissemi-
nation is a widely debated question 128 which will receive further
scrutiny by those who evaluate the feasibility of a national resale
royalty as mandated by the current version of the Kennedy Bill.
Supporters of the California resale royalty argue that it bene-
fits artists and encourages creative production, subsidizing the
artist as the public performance right does for the composer of
music. 129 While admitting that the resale royalty is often ig-
nored and difficult to enforce, they would point to the considera-
ble number of artists who have benefited from it. For example,
studies conducted of both the California statute ° and the
French resale royalty' show that many artists have been signifi-
cantly remunerated since the royalty's adoption in 1920.
Critics of the resale royalty claim that it has not worked and
has harmed the art market in countries having long experience
with it. For example, some French art dealers insist that the re-
sale royalty has driven a portion of the art market away from
France. In effect, they argue that a rational buyer will avoid
purchasing a work in France if its equivalent can be obtained
without incurring extra cost elsewhere. One cannot, however,
blame the decline of the French art market on the resale royalty.
Although the French art market is not what it was before World
War II, its decline cannot be traced to the resale royalty. There
are simply too many other factors at play-such as the advent of a
dynamic New York market after the Second World War.
Those who disfavor the resale royalty have cogent economic
arguments, but have difficulty proving them empirically. Gener-
ally, critics argue that the resale royalty will create the worst of all
126 One might compare this provision with that of France, which imposes a resale
royalty on the gross sale of a work whether it appreciates or depreciates. See Loi de II
Mars 1957, supra note 10, art. 42.
127 Visual Artists Right Act, supra note 2, § 3.
128 See F. FELDMAN, S. WEIL & S. BIEDERMAN, ART LAW: RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF
CREATORS AND COLLECTORS 555-605 (1986); S. BRANnOW, LAW AND FINE ART SELECTED
BIBLIOGRAPHY 13-17 (1984).
129 See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
13o Hearing on S. 1619, supra note 6 (remark of Leonard DuBof).
1'1 See, e.g., Note, The Applicabilitv of Droit de Suite in the United States 3 B.C. INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 433, 440 (1980).
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possible worlds for both artists and art buyers.' -3 2 Essentially, the
resale royalty imposes a seven percent tax on the sale of art,
which, like any tax, lowers the demand for a particular good or
service. In this case, the seven percent tax on the sale of art will
arguably depress the art market. Moreover, critics assert that the
resale royalty will remunerate the well-known artist at the ex-
pense of the unknown artist. 1 3 1
Finally, critics argue that the resale royalty will encourage
neither the production nor the dissemination of art. Because at
least ninety percent of the artwork available does not have a re-
sale market at all,' 3" and most new artists lack any initial market
for their work,' 35 an increase of funds is needed to purchase
works of art. This increase could be accomplished by providing
tax breaks or direct subsidies. 36 The resale royalty, however,
reduces those funds by imposing a tax on a work of art. The
result will be a smaller and less dynamic art market.
It appears that a national resale royalty will not become an
immediate reality. If the Kennedy Bill is passed, the question will
be studied during the one year mandate. We are left, however,
with an unsatisfactory situation that calls for national uniformity
one way or another. What would happen if another state, besides
California, passed a resale royalty law? For example, take the sit-
uation in which a California resident sold a painting in New York.
Because the two bases of jurisdiction are residency of the seller
and the place of sale, could royalties be imposed by both Califor-
nia and New York?137 The answer is not clear. Finally, the Cali-
fornia Act is subject to strong preemption arguments under
section 301 of the Act, even though the issue was resolved in
favor of the legislation under the 1909 Act.' 8 The lone state
might eventually be deprived of recognizing the resale royalty.
If the resale royalty is revived, it should incorporate the re-
132 At the Senate Subcommittee Hearings on Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks,
several speakers argued that "such a law would be diilfcult to administer, at the least,
and possibly injurious to the careers of some young arlists." See McGill, U.S. Bill oil
Artists Right is Debated, N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1986, at C33, col. 1.
133 Visual Artists Rights Act: Hearing on H.R. 3221 Before the Snbcomm. oil Coirts Civil
Liberties and the Administration ofJnstice of the House Comn. oii theJudiciaor, 100th Cong., I st
Sess. 291 (1987) (statement of R. Fredrick Woolworth) [hereinafter Hearing on H.R.
3221].
134 See, e.g., Bolch, Damon, & Hinshaw, l'isual Artists Rights Act of 1987:.4 Case oJ M.1is-
guided Legislatioii, 8 CAro J. 71 (1988).
135 See Weil, Resale Royalties: .Vobody Beiiefi/s, ARTNEws, Mar. 1978, at 58.
136 Hearings oii S. 1619, supra note 6. (remark of David Lloyd Kreeger).
137 See L. DUBOFF, ART LAW IN A Nu'rsHElI. 240-44 (1984).
138 See Morseburg v. Baylon, 621 F.2d 972 (9th Cir.), cert. deiiied, 440 U.S. 983 (1980);
2 M. NIMMER, NiMMER ON COPYRIGHIT § 8.221B] (1988).
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